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In this case, plaintiff/appellant Steven Graham (“Graham”) seeks to 
avoid the procedure and remedy established by the Utah legislature for 
complaints of alleged retaliatory termination in violation of the Utah 
Occupational Safety and Health Act (“UOSH Act”) in order to pursue a 
common-law claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy.  He does 
so because he “prefer[s] . . . the claims and remedies which are available in 
[tort]” over those available under the UOSH Act.  (Declaration of Steven Eric 
Graham, R. 0075-0077, ¶ 12.)   
Graham’s preference is irrelevant in this case.  The Utah legislature has 
already addressed the precise injury for which Graham seeks to recover in tort 
and specified a detailed scheme for the handling of complaints of such an 
injury.  As a result, Graham’s wrongful discharge claim is properly analyzed 
using the indispensable element test, which this Court adopted in Retherford 
v. AT&T Communications of Mountain States, Inc., as “the correct analytical 
model for determining whether a statutory cause of action forecloses a common 
law remedy.”  844 P.2d 949, 963 (Utah 1992).  The district court correctly 
analyzed Graham’s wrongful discharge claim under the indispensable element 
test and determined that, under that test, Graham’s claim is preempted by the 
UOSH Act. (R. 0587-0588, at ¶6.)  Graham omits any mention in his Brief of 
Appellant (“Opening Brief”) of the district court’s analysis and rejection of 
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his claim under the indispensable element test.  But the district court’s analysis 
of his claim under that test is dispositive of both his claim and this appeal. 
In his Opening Brief, Graham challenges only the portion of the district 
court’s ruling holding that his wrongful discharge claim is preempted under 
the more generally applicable field preemption analysis applied by this Court 
in Gilger v. Hernandez, 2000 UT 23, and Gottling v. P.R. Incorporated, 2002 
UT 95.  As set forth below, however, the district court also correctly concluded 
that Graham’s wrongful discharge claim is preempted under a field preemption 
analysis, and Graham’s arguments to the contrary are without merit.  
Accordingly, this Court should affirm the order of the district court dismissing 
Graham’s wrongful discharge claim as preempted by the UOSH Act.  
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Issue  Did the trial court commit reversible error by granting Albertson’s 
partial summary judgement dismissing Graham’s claim of wrongful discharge 
in violation of public policy as preempted by the UOSH Act, including but not 
limited to Section 203 thereof (“Section 203”).  Utah Code § 34A-6-203 (copy 
attached hereto as Addendum Item 1). 
Standard of Appellate Review  A ruling on summary judgment is 
reviewed for correctness without deference to its legal conclusions.  Gottling v. 
P.R. Incorporated, 2002 UT 95, ¶ 5. 
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Preservation  The issue on appeal was directly presented to and 
decided by the district court in its Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment, Granting Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment, and Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Perform Discovery 
Related to Defendant’s Wealth.  (R. 585-589.)    
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. FACTS OF THE CASE 
On or about December 6, 2016, Graham suffered a minor injury to his 
back while lifting a bag of potatoes at Albertson’s Distribution Center in Salt 
Lake City.  (R. 0002 ¶ 7, 0115, 0132, 0272, 0322-0324, 0365-0366.) Graham 
reported his injury to his supervisor, who completed an injury report with 
Graham and assisted Graham in obtaining medical evaluation.  (R. 0115, 0133, 
0477 ¶7.)  Thereafter, Albertson’s covered Graham’s medical costs through 
workers’ compensation, and gave him temporary alternative work within his 
work restrictions.  (R. 0115, 0133, 0477-481 ¶¶ 7-8, 013-22, 0484-0485 ¶¶ 7-
11.) 
A little more than two months later, Graham’s employment with 
Albertson’s was terminated.  (R. 0115.)  The parties dispute the reason for 
Graham’s termination.  Albertson’s contends that Graham’s termination, 
which was originally initiated by Graham as a voluntary termination for 
personal reasons and to focus on school, ultimately was a result of a 
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combination of factors, including various work-related incidents and 
dishonesty by Graham.  (R. 0289-0294 ¶¶ 9-19.)  Graham contends he was 
terminated for reporting his injury to Albertson’s.  (R. 0007-0008.)   
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
About three months later, on June 8, 2017, Graham filed a complaint 
with the Division of Occupational Safety and Health (“Division”) pursuant to 
Section 203 alleging that Albertson’s had terminated him in retaliation for 
reporting a work-related injury.  (R. 0076.) The Division investigated Graham’s 
complaint and issued an Order that the evidence did not support a finding that 
Albertson’s had terminated Graham in violation of the UOSH Act.  Id.  On 
November 6, 2017, Graham administratively appealed this Order to the Labor 
Commission’s Division of Adjudication.  Id.  That appeal is pending. 
On January 29, 2018, Shortly after he filed his administrative appeal, 
Graham filed a Complaint against Albertson’s in Third District Court.  (R. 
0001-0014.)  In his Complaint, Graham asserts a claim for wrongful discharge 
in violation of public policy based on allegations that Albertson’s terminated 
him in retaliation for having reported a workplace injury to Albertson’s, in 
violation of the public policy against retaliatory discharge embodied in Section 
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203.1  Id.  (R. 7-8.)  Shortly after Albertson’s filed its Answer and the parties 
exchanged initial disclosures, Graham filed a motion for partial summary 
judgment seeking a ruling that his wrongful discharge claim is not preempted 
by the UOSH Act.  (R. 0053-0062.)  Graham also filed a declaration in support 
of his motion in which he represented to the district court that “[d]ue to the 
limited procedures and remedies which are available for claimants under Utah 
Code §34A-6-203, I prefer to pursue the claims and remedies which are 
available in the present action in lieu of my pending claims in the Utah Labor 
Commission.” (R. 0075-0077, ¶ 12.)  Graham further informed that court that 
“[s]hould this Court decide to grant my present Motion, it is my intention to 
voluntarily dismiss my proceeding in the Utah Labor Commission.” (R. 0075-
0077, ¶ 13.) 
Albertson’s opposed Graham’s motion, (R. 0114-0131), and filed a cross-
motion for partial summary judgement seeking a ruling that Graham’s 
wrongful discharge claim is preempted by the UOSH Act, including but not 
limited to Section 203.  (R. 0132-0136.)  On July 30, 2018, Graham filed a 
Notice of Supplemental Authority, arguing that Utah Administrative Code 
R614-1-10.L.3-5 (copy attached hereto as  Addendum Item 3), reflects a 
                                      
1 Graham’s Complaint also assert claims for purported breach of contract and 
breach of the implied warranty of good faith and fair dealing.  (R. 0009-0011.)  
These claims remain pending in the district court.   
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legislative intent that the administrative remedy established by Section 203 
not be the exclusive remedy for retaliatory termination in violation of the 
UOSH Act.  (R. 0212-0214.)  On September 21, 2018, Graham filed a Second 
Notice of Supplemental Authority, in which he argued that Utah Code section 
34A-6-110 (copy attached hereto as Addendum Item 2) also reflects a 
legislative intent that the UOSH Act not preempt claims of wrongful discharge 
in violation of public policy. (R. 0541-0542.) 
On October 12, 2018, the district court entered an order ruling that 
Graham’s claim of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy is preempted 
by the UOSH Act, including but not limited to Section 203.  (R. 0585-0589) 
(copy attached hereto as Addendum Item 4.)  The district court based its ruling 
on both general field preemption principles (R. 0586-0587, at ¶¶ 1-5) and on 
the more specialized “indispensable element” test adopted by this Court in 
Retherford v. AT&T Communications of Mountain States, Inc., 844 P.2d 949 
(Utah 1992).  (R. 0587-0588, at ¶ 6.)   
In applying general field preemption principles, the district court ruled 
that a preemptive intent is implied by the structure and purpose of the UOSH 
Act.  (R. 0586-0587, at ¶ 3.)  The district court explained that in enacting the 
UOSH Act, “the legislature put in place a comprehensive piece of legislation to 
provide for the safety and health of workers and provided a coordinated plan 
to establish standards to do so,” including “procedures, a scheme of regulation, 
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and a bureaucratic system to implement its aims in a timely and cost-effective 
approach.”  Id.  The district court further explained that employee retaliation 
complaints to the Division “address the concerns not only of individual 
employees but also the broader purpose of providing for the safety and welfare 
of all workers through the broader regulatory structure of the UOSH Act,” and 
that allowing common-law tort claim outside the process established by the 
UOSH Act “runs counter to the purpose of the UOSH Act in that it could 
discourage employees from making a claim under the UOSH Act in order to 
pursue broader remedies than those provided for under the UOSH Act.” 
(R. 0587, at ¶5.) 
In reaching its conclusion, the district court expressly noted Graham’s 
argument that a non-preemptive legislative intent is indicated by Utah 
Administrative Code R614-1-10.L, but rejected that argument based on a plain 
reading of the rule, which on its face applies only to arbitration and other 
agency proceedings. (R. 0587, at ¶ 4.)  The district court did not explicitly 
address the merits of Graham’s argument about Utah Code section 34A-6-110, 
but it expressly acknowledged that Graham had “filed Plaintiff’s Second Notice 
of Supplemental Authority,” and affirmatively stated that, in issuing its order, 
it had “considered the pleadings and submissions of the parties, the arguments 
of counsel, and the relevant law.”  (R. 0586.)   
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The portions of the district court’s order applying field preemption 
principles are referred to and quoted in Graham’s Opening Brief.  Opening 
Brief, at 6-7.  The portion of the district court’s analysis and ruling based on 
the indispensable element test, which is not set forth or even acknowledged in 
Graham’s Opening Brief, is set forth below: 
The Court further finds that when it analyzes plaintiff’s common-
law claim in this action, the UOSH Act provides the public policy 
supporting his common-law claim, and it establishes a procedure 
and remedy to address his claim, which is retaliation or discharge 
for reporting a workplace injury in violation of the UOSH Act.  As 
such, the Court finds that the claim at issue comes within the scope 
of the UOSH Act’s preemptive effect.  The Court comes to this 
conclusion based on the indispensable element test set forth in 
Retherford v. AT&T Communications of Mountain States, Inc., 844 
P.2d 949 (Utah 1992).  In applying this test, preemption depends 
on the nature of the injury for which the plaintiff makes the claim.  
Here, in Utah Code section 34A-6-203, the UOSH Act specifically 
addresses retaliation or discharge as a result of reporting a 
workplace injury, the very injury claimed by plaintiff in this action.  
The Court finds that the UOSH Act establishes a procedure for 
reporting and investigating a claim of retaliation and discharge, a 
forum to issue a decision or order, a remedy, and a procedure for 
review and appeal of that order.  Further, in claiming discharge in 
violation of public policy in his tort claim, plaintiff relies on the 
UOSH Act as the statement of public policy.  In the absence of the 
UOSH Act, plaintiff would be unable to make out his common-law 
claim.  As such, the Court finds that the harm the UOSH Act 
addresses is an indispensable element of plaintiff’s tort cause of 
action and, therefore, the UOSH Act preempts plaintiff’s common-
law claim here. 
(R. 0587-0588, at ¶6.)   
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On October 2, 2018, Graham filed a Motion to Certify Ruling Pursuant 
to Rule 54(b).  (R. 5046-0552.)  The district court denied that Motion on 
December 17, 2018.  (R. 0679-0681.) 
On November 1, 2018, Graham filed a Petition for Permission to Appeal 
with this Court.  (R. 0620-0634.)  On December 26, 2018, this Court granted 
that Petition.  (R. 0794.)   
On December 7, 2018, Graham filed a Motion for Leave to Amend 
Complaint.  (R. 0642-0648.)  Among other things, Graham sought to amend his 
Complaint to assert a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy 
based on allegations that Albertson’s retaliated against him, including 
terminating his employment, not for exercising a right under the UOSH Act, 
but “for claiming and receiving workers’ compensation benefits . . . .”  (R. 0642-
0643.)  Albertson’s opposed Graham’s Motion to Amend as untimely without 
any justification offered for delay, as unduly prejudicial, and as an attempted 
end run around the district court’s dismissal of his wrongful discharge claim 
based on the UOSH Act.  (R. 0684-0791.) 
On December 27, 2018, Graham filed a Motion to Stay Proceedings 
Pending Decision on Appeal.  The district court granted that motion on 
February 4, 2019.2 
                                      
2 As a result, Graham’s Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint remains pending 
in the action below. 
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III. DISPOSITION BELOW  
On October 12, 2018, the district court entered an order ruling that 
Graham’s wrongful discharge claim is preempted by the UOSH Act, including 
but not limited to Section 203.  (R. 0585-0589.)  Accordingly, the district court 
denied Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and granted 
Albertson’s Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, dismissing 
Graham’s claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy.   
As noted above, on December 26, 2018, this Court granted Graham’s 
Petition for Permission to Appeal.  (R. 7094.)   
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The district court correctly ruled that Graham’s wrongful discharge 
claim is preempted by the UOSH Act under the indispensable element test.  
The indispensable element test was adopted by this Court in Retherford v. 
AT&T Communications of Mountain States, Inc., as “the correct analytical 
model for determining whether a statutory cause of action forecloses a common 
law remedy.”  844 P.2d 949, 963 (Utah 1992).  Under this test, preemption 
depends on ‘“the nature of the injury for which [the] plaintiff makes [the] claim, 
not the nature of the defendant’s act which the plaintiff alleges to have been 
responsible for that injury.”’”  Id. at 965 (citations omitted).  The indispensable 
element test has two prongs.  Under the first prong, a court determines the 
nature of the injury the statute in question is designed to address.  Under the 
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second prong, a court determines whether the injury the relevant statute is 
designed to address supplies an indispensable element of the cause of action 
being examined.  Id. at 965-966.  If it does, that cause of action is preempted.  
Id. at 966. 
In this case, the district court properly applied the indispensable element 
test and held that Graham’s wrongful discharge claim is preempted by the 
UOSH Act.  The district court first correctly determined that the nature of the 
injury that the UOSH Act is designed to address is “retaliation or discharge as 
a result of reporting a workplace injury, the very injury claimed by [Graham] 
in this action.”  (R. 0587-0588, at ¶6.)  The district court next correctly 
determined that discharge in retaliation for reporting a workplace injury is an 
indispensable element of Graham’s claim for wrongful discharge in violation of 
public policy.  Id.  To prove his claim, Graham must prove that his alleged 
discharge contravenes a “clear and substantial public policy” of the State of 
Utah.  Retherford, 844 P.2d at 966.  The district court noted that “in claiming 
discharge in violation of public policy . . . , [Graham] relies on the UOSH Act 
as the statement of public policy.  In the absence of the UOSH Act, plaintiff 
would be unable to make out his common-law claim.”  (R. 0587-0588, at ¶6.)  
According, the district court properly concluded that “the harm the UOSH Act 
addresses is an indispensable element of [Graham’s] tort cause of action and, 
therefore, the UOSH Act preempts [Graham’s] common-law claim here.”  Id. 
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The district court also correctly ruled that Graham’s wrongful discharge 
claim is preempted under the more generally applicable field preemption 
analysis applied by this Court in Gilger v. Hernandez, 2000 UT 23, and 
Gottling v. P.R. Incorporated, 2002 UT 95.  The district court first correctly 
noted that although the UOSH Act does not contain an express exclusive 
remedy provision, “a preemptive intent is implied by the structure and purpose 
of the UOSH Act.”  (R. 0587, at ¶ 3.)  The purpose of the UOSH Act is to “put 
in place a comprehensive piece of legislation to provide for the safety and 
health of workers and provide[] a coordinated plan to establish standards to do 
so.”  Id.  To further that purpose, “[t]he UOSH Act establishes standards, 
procedures, a scheme of regulation, and a bureaucratic system to implement 
its aims in a timely and cost-effective approach.”  Id.   
The district court further found that allowing Graham’s wrongful 
discharge claim could stand as an obstacle to accomplishment and execution of 
the full purpose and objectives of the UOSH Act.  (R. 0587, at ¶ 5.)  The district 
court explained that allowing a wrongful discharge claim for retaliatory 
termination under the UOSH Act “could discourage employees from making a 
claim under the UOSH Act in order to pursue broader remedies than those 
provided for under the UOSH Act, and that claims under the UOSH Act 
address the concerns not only of individual employees but also the broader 
purpose of providing for the safety and welfare of all workers through the 
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broader regulatory structure of the UOSH Act.”  Id.  This conclusion is a matter 
of common sense, and is further supported in this case by Graham’s own 
representations to the district court that he desired to pursue his wrongful 
discharge claim over an administrative claim under the UOSH Act because he 
“prefer[s] . . . the claims and remedies which are available in [tort]” over those 
available under the UOSH Act, and that if the district court permitted him to 
do so, it was his intention to voluntarily dismiss his pending administrative 
proceeding. (Declaration of Steven Eric Graham, R. 0075-0077, ¶¶ 12-13.)  
Discouraging employees from filing complaints with the Division could impede 
the Division’s ability to execute the full purpose and objectives of UOSH Act 
because it would decrease information coming to the Division about conduct 
potentially indicative of unsafe or unhealthy workplaces or that interferes with 
Division’s ability to perform its statutory mandates of conducting workplace 
inspections and investigating worker injuries, Utah Code § 34A-6-301; 
enforcing rules requiring employers to report workplace injuries to the 
Division, id.; issuing citations for violations, id. § 34A-6-302; and petitioning 
district courts to restrain dangerous workplace conditions or practices.  Id. § 
34A-6-305. 
Graham’s arguments against field preemption are without merit. 
Graham argues that the district court “failed to allocate the burden of proof to 
[Albertson’s]” because the district court’s order does not expressly recite that 
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Albertson’s had the burden of proof in establishing preemption.  Opening Brief 
at 11-12.  Yet it is clear from the face of the district court’s order and the 
memoranda submitted by Albertson’s in connection with the parties’ cross-
motions for partial summary judgment that Albertson’s met its burden of proof, 
as each of the grounds relied on by the district court were argued by 
Albertson’s.  Graham also argues that the district court’s ruling “is based upon 
an unsupported factual assumption that workers will forego an administrative 
claim under the UOSH Act to pursue their common law remedy.”  Opening 
Brief at 16.  But, as noted above, the conclusion that allowing persons to pursue 
tort claims with more generous available damages and a longer limitations 
period would discourage at least some of them from making administrative 
complaints to the Division is not only a matter of common sense, it is supported 
by Graham’s own stated intent in this case. 
Graham’s argument that the district court did not properly consider his 
“evidence” against preemption is likewise without merit.  Opening Brief at 17-
21.  In its order, the district court expressly discussed the administrative rule 
cited by Graham in his first Notice of Supplemental Authority and found it 
inapplicable on its face. (R. 0587, at ¶ 4.)  And, while the district court’s order 
does not discuss the statutory provision cited by Graham in his Second Notice 
of Supplemental Authority, it explicitly refers to that Second Notice of 
Supplemental Authority and expressly states that the district court considered 
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all of the parties’ submissions in arriving at its ruling.  (R. 0586.)  Further, like 
the administrative rule cited by Graham, the statutory provision he cites is 
inapplicable on its face.  The language and context of that statutory provision 
shows that it was intended to preserve existing law relating to physical or 
mental injuries on the job. 
Finally, Graham’s argument that the limited remedies available under 
Section 203 “establish an inference against pre-emption” also fails.  See 
Opening Brief at 22.  Graham does not support this argument with citation to 
any supporting legal authority, and Utah law on preemption is decidedly to the 
contrary.  Indeed, this Court found the common law claims in both Retherford 
and Gottling were preempted notwithstanding that the remedies under the 
relevant statute were limited (in the case of Retherford) or not available at all 
(in the case of Gottling). 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT GRAHAM’S 
CLAIM FOR WRONGFUL DISCHARGE IN VIOLATION OF 
PUBLIC POLICY IS PREEMPTED BY THE UOSH ACT.  
The district court correctly ruled that Graham’s claim for wrongful 
discharge in violation of public policy based on the UOSH Act is preempted by 
the UOSH Act under both general field preemption principles and under the 
indispensable element test set forth in Retherford v. AT&T Communications 
of Mountain States, Inc., 844 P.2d 949 (Utah 1992).  Because the indispensable 
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element test governs in this case and is dispositive of Graham’s claim, it is 
addressed first below.   
A. Graham’s Claim Is Preempted Under the “Indispensable 
Element” Test Adopted by Retherford.   
In his Opening Brief, Graham omits to mention the district court’s ruling 
that his wrongful discharge claim is preempted under the indispensable 
element test adopted by this Court in Retherford v. AT&T Communications of 
Mountain States, Inc., 844 P.2d 949 (Utah 1992).3  However, in Retherford, this 
Court squarely held “that the indispensable element test is the correct 
analytical model for determining whether a statutory cause of action forecloses 
a common law remedy.”  Id. at 963.  This is the precise determination made by 
the district court in this case and the precise question presented in this appeal.   
In Retherford, the plaintiff claimed her former employer terminated her 
in retaliation for complaining of sexual harassment.  Id. at 957.  Rather than 
filing an administrative charge of discrimination under the Utah Anti-
Discrimination Act (“UADA”), Retherford sued her former employer for 
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy because “she hope[d] to avoid 
                                      
3 This Court should affirm the district court’s ruling for this reason alone.  See 
Roach v. Los Angeles & S.L.R. Co., 74 Utah 545, 280 P.2d 1053, 1055 (1929) 
(“It is well settled in this jurisdiction that questions not assigned, or, though 
assigned, but not briefed or discussed, will not be considered.”); iDrive 
Logistics, LLC v. Integracore LLC, 2018 UT App. 40, ¶ 76 (appellate court 
rejects challenge to district court ruling where the appellant fails to address in 
its arguments on appeal the basis of the district court’s ruling). 
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[the UADA’s] provisions and pursue her common law remedies. . . .” 4  Id. at 
961.  Her former employer moved to dismiss this claim on the ground, among 
others, that it was preempted by the UADA (and Title VII).  The trial court 
converted the motion into a motion for summary judgment, and granted it.   
In reviewing the trial court’s dismissal of this claim, the question as 
framed by the Retherford Court was, “Does the [UADA’s] exclusive remedy 
provision preempt common law causes of action based on the same facts 
necessary to prove a cause of action under the statute, including common law 
causes of action for discharge in violation of public policy[?]”  Id. at 959.  After 
examining different approaches used by courts in other jurisdictions to answer 
such a question, the Retherford Court held “that the indispensable element test 
is the correct analytical model for determining whether a statutory cause of 
action forecloses a common law remedy.”  Id. at 963.   
The “indispensable element test” requires a court to “begin with the task 
of determining what injuries [the statute] is designed to address,” and then 
take “the next step … to determine whether [those injuries supply] an 
indispensable element of any of [the plaintiff’s] causes of action.”  Id. at 965-
66.  If they do, the claim is preempted.  Id.  
                                      
4 This is precisely what Graham admits he seeks to do in this case. (R. 0075-
0077, ¶¶ 12- 13.) 
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Applying this test to Retherford’s public policy claim, this Court first 
concluded that the UADA was designed, among other things, to address “all 
manner of employment discrimination,” including retaliation.  Id.  Having 
made this determination, this Court next queried whether “employer 
retaliation supplies an indispensable element of” Retherford’s public policy 
claim.  Id.  This Court answered that question in affirmative, and held that 
that Retherford’s public policy claim was preempted.  This Court explained as 
follows: 
The only possible source in Utah’s statutes or constitution for a 
clear and substantial public policy allegedly violated by 
Retherford’s discharge is the UADA’s prohibition of retaliation for 
good faith complaints of employment discrimination. . . . [W]e find 
that in the absence of this public policy declaration, Retherford 
would be unable to allege an action for this tort.  Simply put, if 
there were no UADA policy against retaliation, there could 
be no tort for discharge in violation of this public policy. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
Graham’s public policy claim is materially indistinguishable from the 
public policy claim in Retherford.  The plain purpose of Section 203, on which 
Graham relies for a public policy, is to prohibit retaliation against an employee 
who exercises a right under the UOSH Act.5  In other words, under the first 
                                      
5 In relevant part, Section 203 provides as follows: 
(1) A person may not discharge or in any way retaliate against 
an employee because the employee: 
. . . 
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prong of the indispensable element test, retaliation for exercising a right under 
the UOSH Act is the injury Section 203 was designed to address.  Further, 
under the second prong of the indispensable element test (and just as in 
Retherford), retaliation is an indispensable element of Graham’s wrongful 
discharge claim.  The only possible statutory source for the public policy 
against retaliation that Graham advocates is Section 203.  In the absence of 
Section 203’s prohibition against retaliation, Graham would not even be able 
to allege a public policy claim.  “Simply put, if there were no [UOSH Act] policy 
against retaliation, there could be no tort for discharge in violation of public 
policy.”   Retherford, 844 P.2d at 996.   
Thus, under the indispensable element test, the UOSH Act preempts 
Graham’s public policy claim.  See also Johnson v. E. A. Miller, Inc., 172 F.3d 
62 (10th Cir. Feb 25, 1999) (unpublished), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1004 (1999) 
(dismissing common law wrongful discharge claims as preempted by Section 
203 and the UADA, stating: “[A]ny ‘public policy’ actions which are based on a 
statutory cause of action are preempted.”)  The district court correctly applied 
the indispensable element test to this case, ruling as follows: 
The Court further finds that when it analyzes plaintiff’s common-
law claim in this action, the UOSH Act provides the public policy 
                                      
(c) exercises a right granted by this chapter on behalf of the 
employee or others. 
Utah Code § 34A-6-203(1).  
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supporting his common-law claim, and it establishes a procedure 
and remedy to address his claim, which is retaliation or discharge 
for reporting a workplace injury in violation of the UOSH Act.  As 
such, the Court finds that the claim at issue comes within the scope 
of the UOSH Act’s preemptive effect.  The Court comes to this 
conclusion based on the indispensable element test set forth in 
Retherford v. AT&T Communications of Mountain States, Inc., 844 
P.2d 949 (Utah 1992).  In applying this test, preemption depends 
on the nature of the injury for which the plaintiff makes the claim.  
Here, in Utah Code section 34A-6-203, the UOSH Act specifically 
addresses retaliation or discharge as a result of reporting a 
workplace injury, the very injury claimed by plaintiff in this action.  
The Court finds that the UOSH Act establishes a procedure for 
reporting and investigating a claim of retaliation and discharge, a 
forum to issue a decision or order, a remedy, and a procedure for 
review and appeal of that order.  Further, in claiming discharge in 
violation of public policy in his tort claim, plaintiff relies on the 
UOSH Act as the statement of public policy.  In the absence of the 
UOSH Act, plaintiff would be unable to make out his common-law 
claim.  As such, the Court finds that the harm the UOSH Act 
addresses is an indispensable element of plaintiff’s tort cause of 
action and, therefore, the UOSH Act preempts plaintiff’s common-
law claim here. 
(R. 0587-0588, at ¶6.)   
This Court should affirm the district court’s order. 
B. The District Court Also Correctly Ruled that Graham’s 
Claim Is Preempted by the UOSH Act Under the Doctrine 
of Field Preemption.   
Even if this case were not governed by Retherford, which it is, it would 
still fail as a matter of law because, as the district court also correctly observed, 
the purpose and structure of the UOSH Act demonstrate the Utah legislature’s 
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intent to preempt the field of law applying to claims of discharge in retaliation 
for exercising a right under the UOSH Act.6   
1. The UOSH Act Creates a Scheme of Statutory 
Regulation so Pervasive as to Make Reasonable an 
Inference of Preemptive Intent as to Conduct 
Explicitly Addressed by the UOSH Act. 
This Court first addressed “field preemption” in Gilger v. Hernandez, 
2000 UT 23.  In Gilger, this Court was asked to decide whether Utah’s 
Dramshop Act preempted a common law negligence claim against a social host 
                                      
6 That the indispensable element test of Retherford governs in this case is made 
further clear by this Court’s description of this test in its subsequent decisions 
in Gilger v. Hernandez, 2000 UT 23, and Gottling v. P.R. Incorporated, 2002 
UT 95.  In Gilger, this Court explained that the indispensable element test 
applies to a specific type of preemption: where the statute at issue 
offers a remedy for a specific type of injury caused by an act of the 
defendant and where the asserted common law causes of action, 
while based on the same facts, offer a remedy for a potentially 
different injury based on those same facts.  In such situations, we 
have held that the intent to preempt is determined by “the nature 
of the injury for which [the] plaintiff makes [the] claim, not the 
nature of the defendant’s act which the plaintiff alleges to have 
been responsible for that injury.” (internal citations omitted).   
Gilger, 2000 UT 23, ¶ 10.  The Gilger Court further explained that it did not 
face that narrow type of preemption claim in the case before it, as the 
Dramshop Act did not offer a statutory remedy to the plaintiff in that case; 
therefore, Retherford was inapplicable, “although it remains fully 
appropriate in situations for which it was designed.”  Id. (emphasis 
added).  In Gottling, this Court again distinguished Retherford on like grounds, 
and reaffirmed its applicability to cases involving a determination whether a 
statutory cause of action forecloses a common law remedy.  2002 UT 95, ¶ 9, n.1.   
As noted above, this case presents the same situation as Retherford, because 
the UOSH Act offers a remedy for the precise injury for which Graham seeks 
to recover through a common-law tort claim for wrongful discharge. 
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who supplied beer, rather than liquor, to a minor guest who then stabbed 
another guest.  This Court found that although the Dramshop Act did not have 
an express preemption provision, and did not apply to a social host who 
supplied beer (as opposed to liquor) to a minor, it nonetheless preempted a 
negligence claim because that Act preempted the entire field of negligence 
liability for the supply of alcohol to one who then causes harm.  Id. at ¶¶ 9-11.  
This Court found evidence of the Dramshop Act’s preemptive intent in the fact 
that, “The Act evidences an overall scheme of regulation of liability for liquor 
providers. Its very comprehensiveness suggests a purpose and intent to 
preempt inconsistent common law.”  Id. at ¶ 12.  This Court further 
commented, 
Although the matter is not without doubt, it appears on balance 
that the policy reflected in the careful legislative designations of 
those liable and those not liable under the Act cannot coexist with 
the imposition by courts of different standards of care and damage 
exposure for some of those the legislature has decided should not 
be liable under the Act. We conclude that the common law of 
negligence is preempted insofar as it may impose liability for acts 
that the Dramshop Act reaches. Therefore, plaintiffs’ common law 
negligence liability claims based on Hernandez’s serving alcohol to 
the minor Martinez, conduct covered by the Act, were properly 
dismissed. 
Id. at ¶ 13.   
Two years later, this Court again addressed field preemption in Gottling 
v. P.R. Incorporated, and concluded that the UADA was intended to preempt 
the field of employment discrimination claims, including claims against 
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employers too small to be covered by the UADA even though this conclusion 
left the plaintiff without any remedy.  2002 UT 95, ¶¶ 9-13.  In reaching this 
conclusion, the Gottling Court explained that the question was “if the 
legislature, with its broad law-making power, intended to exercise that power 
and to occupy the field in such a way as to exclude the contemporaneous 
application and development of the common law.”  Id. at ¶ 8 (quoting Gilger, 
2000 UT 23, at ¶ 11).  In answering this question, a court should first look for 
language in the statute that reveals an explicit intent to preempt common law.  
If such language is not present, then a court should examine the statute’s 
structure and purpose to determine if they reveal a clear, but implicit, 
preemptive intent.  Id.  Examining the UADA, the Gottling Court found an 
explicit intent to preempt the common law in the UADA’s exclusive-remedy 
provision.  Id. at ¶ 9.  The Gottling Court went further, however, and noted 
that its conclusion would be the same even in the absence of such language, 
based on its structure and purpose.  The Gottling Court explained, 
Even if the UADA lacked an explicit statement of preemptive 
intent, our holding that it preempts common law remedies for 
employment discrimination would not change because a clear 
preemptive intent can be implied from the statute’s structure and 
purpose. The UADA was designed “to prohibit discrimination in 
employment,” and it utilizes a variety of tools to accomplish that 
goal. Not only does it create an administrative remedy for those 
alleging to have been discriminated against by large employers, 
the UADA also provides a remedy to those discriminated against 
by employment agencies, labor organizations, and persons who 
aid, incite, compel, or coerce to commit “discriminatory or 
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prohibited employment practices.” In addition, the UADA “creates 
a substantial bureaucratic system to implement its aims.”  It 
establishes both the Utah Division of Anti–Discrimination and 
Labor and the Utah Anti–Discrimination and Advisory Council. It 
delegates the power to receive, investigate, and pass upon 
complaints. It directs that the “existence, character, causes, and 
extent of” employment discrimination be investigated and studied. 
It provides for the formulation of plans for elimination of 
discrimination, the issuance of publications designed to promote 
good will and eliminate discrimination, and the proposal of 
legislation designed to eliminate discrimination. “Clearly, the 
legislature believed the Act’s purposes were to have broad and 
important implications for the welfare of the Utah Workers.”  Such 
a detailed and far-reaching approach to the problem of 
discrimination, encompassing a wide variety of methods, clearly 
manifests the legislature’s intent to completely blanket the field of 
employment law in Utah.  
Id. at ¶ 12 (internal citations omitted). 
The Gottling Court also found preemptive intent in the UADA’s creation 
of “an elaborate remedial process,” which required an employee alleging 
discrimination to assert a claim with the Antidiscrimination and Labor 
Division (“UALD”) within a set time period; provided for administrative 
handling of the claim, with the UALD attempting settlement and, if 
unsuccessful, investigating the claim; and provided for an award of specified 
(and limited) remedies to a successful complainant–all of which is performed 
without charge to a complainant.  Id. ¶ 13. 
Like the statutes in Gilger and Gottling, the UOSH Act also has a field 
preemptive effect with respect to “conduct covered by the Act . . . .”  See Gilger, 
2000 UT 23, at ¶ 13; Gottling, 2000 UT 23, at ¶ 11.  In particular, a clear 
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preemptive intent can be implied from the UOSH Act’s structure and purpose.  
The stated legislative intent of the UOSH Act is “(1) to preserve human 
resources by providing for the safety and health of workers; and (2) to provide 
a coordinated state plan to implement, establish, and enforce occupational 
safety and health standards as effective as the standards under the Williams-
Steiger Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 651 et seq.”  
Utah Code § 34A-6-102 (emphasis added).  
Also like the UADA, the UOSH Act “utilizes a variety of tools to 
accomplish [its] goal.”  Gottling, 2002 UT 95, ¶ 12.  The UOSH Act vests 
jurisdiction in the Utah Labor Commission and the Division to administer the 
UOSH Act and to establish rules and provisions to carry it into effect.  
Id. § 34A-6-104.  It also directs the Division to conduct research and related 
activities, id. § 34A-6-107; collect and analyze occupational safety statistics, id. 
§ 34A-6-108; and conduct educational programs.  Id. § 34A-6-109.  It further 
directs the Division to issue standards for workplace safety requirements, id. 
§ 34A-6-202; and directs employers to comply with those standards, as well as 
rules and orders issued by the Division.  In addition, the UOSH Act directs the 
Division to inspect workplaces and investigate worker injuries, id. § 34A-6-301; 
issue rules requiring employers to report workplace injuries to the Division, 
id.; issue citations for violations, id. § 34A-6-302; and petition district courts to 
restrain dangerous workplace conditions or practices.  Id. § 34A-6-305.  
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In furtherance of the UOSH Act’s stated purpose and its comprehensive 
statutory scheme, Section 203 prohibits employers from discharging or 
retaliating against employees for filing complaints with the Division, 
participating in proceedings under the UOSH Act, or exercising a right under 
the UOSH Act.  Utah Code § 34A-6-203(1) .  And like the UADA, the UOSH 
Act creates “an elaborate remedial process,” see Gottling, 2002 UT 95, at ¶ 13, 
which requires an employee alleging retaliation to make a complaint to the 
Division within a set period (30 days) of an alleged retaliatory act; requires the 
Division to cause an investigation to be made; and requires the Division, if it 
finds unlawful retaliation, to issue an order finding a violation of Section 203, 
requiring that the violation cease, and (permissively) including “other 
appropriate relief, such as reinstatement of the employee to the employee's 
former position with back pay.”  Id. § 34A-6-203(2)(c)(i).  Either an employer 
or employee may appeal an order of the Division, first administratively, and 
then judicially.  Id. § 34A-6-203(3)(4). 
Thus, just as the Utah Dramshop Act in Gilger covered the field of 
negligence-based liability for social hosts providing alcohol, and the UADA in 
Gottling covered the field of employer discrimination, the UOSH Act covers the 
field of employee retaliation claims.  In addition to providing for comprehensive 
safety and health standards, research, and public education, the UOSH Act 
expressly prohibits retaliation against employees for exercising rights under 
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the UOSH Act, and adopts detailed provisions to enforce its prohibition, 
complete with a specified time period, administrative processing and 
investigation of complaints, limitations on the damages and penalties that a 
claimant can recover, and an elaborate administrative and judicial appeals 
process—and does so without cost to a complainant.  Accordingly, the district 
court correctly concluded that in adopting the UOSH Act, the Utah legislature 
intended to preempt the field that includes claims of retaliation discharge 
specifically addressed by the UOSH Act.  This Court should not permit Graham 
to make an “end-run” around the UOSH Act through pursuit of a common law 
public policy claim, but should affirm the district court’s dismissal of that claim 
with prejudice.  
2. The District Court Properly Concluded that 
Permitting Common Law Wrongful Discharge Claims 
for Conduct Addressed by the UOSH Act Would Stand 
as an Obstacle to the Accomplishment and Execution 
of the Full Purpose and Objectives of the UOSH Act. 
Field preemption is also established when a common-law cause of action 
“may stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full 
purpose and objectives” of a statutory enactment.  See Gottling, 2002 UT 95, 
at ¶ 8 (quoting Gilger, 2000 UT 23 at ¶ 11 (quoting Barnett Bank of Marion 
County v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 31, 116 S. Ct. 1103, 134 L.Ed.2d 237 (1996))).  
In this case, the district court concluded that permitting wrongful discharge 
claims for conduct explicitly covered by Section 204 would stand as an obstacle 
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to the accomplishment and execution of the full purpose and objectives of the 
UOSH Act because it would discourage employees from making administrative 
claims of retaliatory discharge to the Division in order to pursue broader 
remedies in court.  This conclusion was proper and should be affirmed. 
As articulated by the Division in its administrative rule implementing 
Section 203, “Enforcement of the provisions of Section 34A-6-203 is not only a 
matter of protecting rights of individual employees, but also of public interest.”  
Utah Admin. Code R614-1-10.K.  These interests include the Division’s 
statutory mandate to enforce the provisions of the UOSH Act, including 
Section 203.  Accordingly, a request by an employee to withdraw a complaint 
of retaliation filed with the Division “will not necessarily result in termination 
of the Administrator's investigation.  The Administrator’s jurisdiction cannot 
be foreclosed as a matter of law by unilateral action of the employee.”  Id.  
These interests also include the ability of the Division to conduct workplace 
inspections and related investigations unfettered by retaliatory conduct by 
employers.  See Utah Code §§ 34A-6-104, 34A-6-301.  These interests are 
furthered when the Division receives timely complaints from employees of 
alleged retaliatory termination or other retaliatory conduct.  Accordingly, the 
UOSH Act requires that complaints of retaliation by employees be made to the 
Division, and that they be made within 30 days after the retaliatory action.  Id. 
§ 34A-6-203(2)(a).  These requirements allow the Division to investigate 
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potentially retaliatory conduct promptly and before they become stale, see 
Utah Admin. Code R614-1-10.I.4.b., as well as to detect, remedy, and deter 
conduct that may thwart or impair Division inspections, investigations, and 
enforcement actions. 
If claims of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy for alleged 
retaliation in violation of the UOSH Act were permitted, some employees 
subjected to such retaliation would undoubtedly skip making administrative 
complaints of retaliation to the Division and proceed directly to court to pursue 
their individual interests in obtaining broader remedies than those provided 
by the legislature.  Furthermore, some would inevitably do so long after the 
30-day period set by the legislature for complaints of retaliatory termination—
potentially up to four years after the fact.  See Utah Code § 78B-2-307.  Not 
only would this be inconsistent with the legislatively determined forms of relief 
available to successful employees, it would impede the Division’s ability to 
execute the full purpose and objectives of UOSH Act because it would decrease 
information coming to the Division about conduct potentially indicative of 
unsafe or unhealthy workplaces or that interferes with Division’s ability to 
perform its statutory mandates of conducting workplace inspections and 
investigating worker injuries, id. § 34A-6-301; enforcing rules requiring 
employers to report workplace injuries to the Division, id.; issuing citations for 
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violations, id. § 34A-6-302; and petitioning district courts to restrain dangerous 
workplace conditions or practices.  Id. § 34A-6-305. 
3. Graham’s Arguments that the District Court Wrongly 
Found Field Preemption in this Case Are Without 
Merit. 
Graham makes three arguments against the district court’s preemption 
ruling in this Case.  First, he argues that the district court did not apply the 
appropriate legal standards in this case.  Opening Brief at 11-17.  Second, he 
argues that the district court did not properly consider his “evidence” against 
preemption.  Id. at 17-21.  And third, he argues that the limited remedies under 
Section 203 establish an inference against preemption.   Id. at 22-24.  As set 
forth below, each of these arguments is without merit. 
a. The District Court Applied the Appropriate Legal 
Standards in This Case. 
Graham argues that the district court “failed to allocate the burden of 
proof to [Albertson’s]” and that “it did not find a ‘clear and manifest purpose’ 
on the part of the Legislature to pre-empt Mr. Graham’s claims.”  Opening 
Brief at 15.  In support of this argument, Graham notes that “the district 
court's order provides no express reference to the burden of proof relating to 
[Albertson’s] pre-emption defense,” id. at 11-12; and asserts that under State 
v. Jones, 958 P.2d 938 (Utah App. 1998), “pre-emption occurs only where 
there is a ‘clear and manifest’ to pre-empt expressed by the statutory language 
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or by implication from the statutory structure and purpose.”  Id at 13-14 (citing 
Jones, 958 P.2d 938 (Utah App. 1998)).  Graham also cites to Wintergreen 
Group, LC v. Utah Dep't of Transportation, 2007 UT 75, for the proposition 
that “a legislative intent to pre-empt may not be inferred merely from the 
comprehensiveness of a statute.”  Id at 14-15. 
Graham is correct that the district court's order does not expressly refer 
to the burden of proof for establishing preemption.  The lack of any such 
explicit reference does not, of course, mean the district court failed to allocate 
the burden of proof to Albertson’s on this issue.  Indeed, it is evident from the 
face of the district court’s order that Albertson’s met its burden of proof on this 
issue.  In its order, the district court found “that a preemptive intent is implied 
by the structure and purpose of the UOSH Act,” which includes the express 
statutory purpose of the UOSH Act, the comprehensiveness of the UOSH Act, 
and the procedures, scheme of regulation, and bureaucratic system created by 
the UOSH Act to implement its purpose.7  (R. 0587-0587, at ¶ 3.)  These precise 
considerations were presented to the district court by Albertson’s in its 
opposition to Graham’s motion for partial summary judgment (see R. 0120-
0122, 0127-0129) and in its cross-motion for partial summary judgment.  (See 
                                      
7 Moreover, as set forth in Section I.A., supra, the District Court expressly found 
Graham’s claim to be preempted by Section 203 of the UOSH Act under the 
indispensable element test, which governs in this case. (See R. 0587-9588, at ¶ 6.) 
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R. 0133-0135, 0162-0166.)  Similarly, it is of no moment that the district court’s 
order does not recite that it found the preemptive intent of the legislature to 
be “clear and manifest,” as such a conclusion follows from the district court’s 
analysis of the UOSH Act. 
Graham’s reliance on Wintergreen Group, LC v. Utah Dep't of 
Transportation for the proposition that a legislative intent to pre-empt may 
not be inferred merely from the comprehensiveness of a statute is misplaced.  
See Opening Brief at 14-15.  Indeed, Wintergreen Group reversed a trial court’s 
dismissal of constitutional counterclaim because the notion of preemption was 
not conceptually viable in the setting of that case because the case involved “a 
direct clash between a statute and [a] constitutional claim,” rather than a clash 
between two statutes or a statute and a non-constitutional common law claim.  
2007 UT 75, at ¶ 15.   As this Court explained in Wintergreen Group, “Owing 
to its different lineage, a constitutional cause of action can never be preempted 
by statute . . . .”  Id. at ¶ 14.8  Thus, Wintergreen Group is inapplicable and 
does not affect the district court’s order. 
                                      
8 Separately, for the sake of accuracy, Albertson’s notes that Wintergreen 
Group does not state what Graham paraphrases it as stating.  Rather, in dicta 
discussing the conditions necessary to “extinguish a § 1983 claim … based on 
an underlying constitutional right,” Wintergreen Group states that, in that 
particular context, “the presence of a comprehensive statutory scheme, by 
itself, ‘is not necessarily sufficient to demonstrate that Congress intended to 
foreclose a § 1983 remedy.’” Id. 2007 UT 75, at ¶ 15. 
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Last, Graham argues that the district court’s conclusion “is based upon 
an unsupported factual assumption that workers will forego an administrative 
claim under the UOSH Act to pursue their common law remedy.”  Opening 
Brief at 16.  This argument also is without merit.  The district court’s 
conclusion is not based on “an unsupported factual assumption,” but on 
common sense.  And, to the extent the district court’s conclusion required 
anything more from a factual standpoint, it had facts before it (ironically 
supplied by Graham himself) that supported that conclusion.  These facts came 
in the form of Graham’s own declaration submitted in support of his motion for 
partial summary judgment, in which Graham represented to the district court 
that his own preference was to pursue a wrongful discharge claim in this case 
over his administrative complaint because of the broader remedies available 
under a tort cause of action than provided by the legislature in an 
administrative complaint under Section 203. (R. 0075-0077, at ¶¶ 12, 13.)  
Graham’s arguments that the district court applied the wrong legal standards 
in this case are without merit, and the district court’s order should be affirmed. 
b. Graham’s Argument that the District Court Did Not 
Properly Consider His “Evidence” Against Preemption 
Is Without Merit. 
Graham argues in his Opening Brief that the district court did not 
properly consider his “evidence” against preemption.  Opening Brief at 17-21.  
Specifically, Graham argues that the district court failed to consider his 
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arguments that Utah Code section 34A-6-110 and Utah Administrative Code 
R614-1-10.L evidence a legislative intent against preemption of his wrongful 
discharge action.   This argument is also without merit. 
Graham’s argument that the district court did not consider Utah Code 
section 34A-6-110 is based solely on the fact that the district court’s order 
“contains no reference to [that statutory provision].”   Opening Brief at 18.   Of 
course, the mere fact that the district court did not cite section 34A-6-110 or 
explicitly address the merits of Graham’s argument about that section does not 
mean the district court did not consider it.  To the contrary, in its order, the 
district court’s expressly acknowledges that Graham had “filed Plaintiff’s 
Second Notice of Supplemental Authority,” in which he presented his 
argument about section 34A-6-110, and then affirmatively states that in 
issuing its ruling, the district court’s “considered the pleadings and 
submissions of the parties, the arguments of counsel, and the relevant law.”  
(R. 0586.)   
In any event, Graham cited no legal authority in his Second Notice of 
Supplemental Authority in support of the contention that section 110 indicates 
a legislative intent against the preemption of claims for wrongful termination 
based on alleged violations of Section 203.  Similarly, Graham, cites to no such 
authority in his Opening Brief in this appeal.  Furthermore, section 34A-6-110 
is inapplicable on its face to Graham’s wrongful discharge claim.  The heading 
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of section 34A-6-110 reads, “Requirements of other laws not limited or 
repealed–Worker’s Compensation or rights under other laws with respect 
to employment injuries not affected.”  Utah Code § 34A-6-110 (emphasis 
added).  Subsection (2) of section 34A-6-110 provides, in turn, as follows:   
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed or held to supersede or 
in any manner affect workers’ compensation or enlarge or 
diminish or affect the common law or statutory rights, duties, or 
liabilities of employers and employees under any law with respect 
to injuries, occupational or other diseases, or death of 
employees arising out of, or in the course of employment. 
Id. § 34A-6-110(2) (emphasis added).  The plain language of section 34A-6-
110 indicates that it was intended to prevent anything within the UOSH Act 
from disturbing the then-existing elaborate body of statutory and common law 
relating to the rights of employees, employers, and third parties for injuries, 
diseases, or death of employees arising out of or in the course of employment.  
Context demonstrates that the term “injuries” in this provision refers to 
physical or mental injuries on the job.  This context includes the provision’s 
express references to “workers’ compensation,” “employers and employees,” 
and “injuries, occupational, or other diseases, or death of employees.”  Id.  It is 
further demonstrated by the limiting phrase “arising out of, or in the course of 
employment,” which was (and still is) an established term of art used (with 
minor variations over the years) in the Utah Workers’ Compensation Act and 
the construed by numerous judicial decisions as of 1973, when the UOSH Act 
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was enacted.  See, e.g., M & K Corp. v. Indus. Comm'n, 189 P.2d 132, 133–34 
(Utah 1948) (construing term “arising out of or in the course of employment” 
as used in then-section 42–1–43 (1943)); Andreason v. Indus. Comm’n, 100 
P.2d 202, 204 (Utah 1940), reh’g denied, 102 P.2d 894 (construing same term, 
as used in then-Utah Code §§ 42-1-42, 42-1-43 (1933)); Chase v. Indus. 
Comm’n, 17 P.2d 205 (Utah 1932) (construing same term, as used in Laws 
Utah 1921, chap. 67, § 3112); Grasteit v. Indus. Comm’n, 290 P. 764, 768 (Utah 
1930) (discussing same term, as used in Comp. Laws 1917, § 3112, as 
amended); Ocean Accident & Guar. Corp. v. Indus. Comm’n, 245 P. 343 (Utah 
1926) (same); Westerdahl v. State Ins. Fund, 208 P. 494 (Utah 1922) (same); 
Pinyon Queen Mining Co. v. Indus. Comm’n, 204 P. 323 (1922) (same).  And, as 
more recently decided by this Court in Touchard v. La-Z Boy Inc., the 
termination of an employee’s employment does not fall within the scope of this 
term.  2006 UT 71, ¶ 24 (holding that cause of action for wrongful discharge 
does not fall within the exclusive remedy provision of the Utah Workers’ 
Compensation Act). 
Graham’s assertion that the district court did not properly consider his 
argument under Utah Administrative Code R614-1-10.L is similarly without 
merit.  Indeed, the district court not only considered this argument, it explicitly 
rejected it because the court’s “reading of that provision is that it applies to 
arbitration and other agency proceedings, and it does not change the Court’s 
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reading of the UOSH Act as it relates to a common-law tort claim, such as the 
one at issue here.” (R. 0587, at ¶ 4.)  Further, the district court’s reading of 
R614-1-10.L is correct.  R614-1-10.L, captioned “Arbitration or other agency 
proceedings” acknowledges the reality that, concurrently with filing a 
complaint under Section 203, an employee may also pursue remedies “under 
grievance arbitration proceedings in collective bargaining agreements” or may 
resort to “other agencies” for relief, “such as the National Labor Relations 
Board.”  See Utah Admin. Code R614-1-10.L.1.  The rule further states the 
principles used by the Division in such circumstances to balance the exercise 
of its independent jurisdiction to investigate and determine Section 203 
complaints with the policy favoring voluntary resolution of disputes “under 
procedures in collective bargaining agreements” and the principle of paying 
due deference to the jurisdiction of “other agencies,” established to resolve 
disputes that may also be related to Section 203 complaints.  Id. R614-1-10.L.2.  
Nothing in the rule indicates that it applies to the pursuit of tort claims in 
private civil lawsuits.  Separately, as R614-1-10.L is an administrative rule 
issued by an administrative agency, and not a statute or other pronouncement 
by the legislature, it provides no evidence of legislative intent.  Accordingly, 
the district court properly rejected R614-1-10.L as “evidence” of legislative 
intent that the UOSH Act not preempt private causes of action based on 
conduct expressly addressed by Section 203. 
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c. Graham’s Contention that the Limited Remedies 
Under Section 203 Establish an Inference Against Pre-
Emption Is Incorrect. 
Graham’s final argument on appeal is that the limited remedies 
available under Section 203 “establish an inference against pre-emption.”  
Opening Brief at 22.  Notably, Graham does not cite any legal authority in 
support of this argument.  This is understandable, as Utah law on preemption 
is decidedly to the contrary and makes clear that the extent of the remedies 
available under a statute (or whether a statutory remedy is available at all) is 
relevant only to a determination of which test of statutory preemption applies, 
not to whether a statute preempts a common-law cause of action.  In those 
situations where a statute supplies a remedy, “the indispensable element test 
is the correct analytical model for determining whether a statutory cause of 
action forecloses a common law remedy.” Retherford, 844 P.2d at 963.  In 
other situations, the broader field preemption test applied by this Court in 
Gilger and Gottling applies.  See Gilger,  2000 UT 23, at ¶¶ 9-11; Gottling, 2002 
UT 95, ¶¶ 9-13.   
In either situation, if the requirements of the applicable test are met, a 
common law remedy is preempted regardless of whether the result leaves a 
particular plaintiff with a lesser remedy—or none at all.  As made clear by 
Retherford, in the situation where a statute provides a remedy, if the 
requirements of the indispensable element test are met, a common law claim 
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is preempted without regard to whether the statutory remedy is as generous 
than an argued-for common law remedy.  That was the precise situation in 
Retherford, where the recovery available under the statute at issue (the UADA) 
was less generous and the time period for bringing a claim was shorter than at 
common law in tort.  Indeed, the Retherford Court observed that the very 
reason the plaintiff in that case had asserted a common-law wrongful 
discharge cause of action instead of a claim under the UADA was precisely 
because she preferred the broader remedies and the more generous time 
periods available under the common-law claim. Retherford, 844 P.2d at 961 
(“Retherford argues that the UADA has no preemptive effect because she hopes 
to avoid its provisions and pursue her common law remedies.).  Nonetheless, 
this Court held her common law claim preempted by the UADA.  Id. at 966-
967. 
Similarly, under the field preemption test applied Gottling, this Court 
held that the UADA bars all common-law remedies for employment 
discrimination, even in situations where the UADA offers no remedy 
whatsoever to employees because they are employed by employers with less 
than 15 employees, which are not subject to the prohibitions of the UADA.  
2002 UT 95, ¶¶20, 21.  Thus, the fact that a statute provides more limited 
remedies for an injury than those available at common law, or that it may 
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provide no remedy at all for a particular plaintiff, has no bearing on whether a 
common law cause of action is preempted.   
CONCLUSION 
As set forth above, the district court properly held Graham’s wrongful 
discharge claim preempted under the indispensable element test adopted by 
this Court in Retherford.  Graham does not directly challenge, or even address, 
this holding.  Rather, Graham ignores it and seeks to avoid preemption solely 
by challenging the district court’s alternative holding that his claim is 
preempted by the more generally applicable preemption analysis applied by 
this Court in Gottling.  Graham should not be permitted to do so. 
The indispensable element test is a specialized test adopted by this Court 
for the precise circumstances here—where a statute addresses an injury that 
is an indispensable element of a cause of action asserted by a plaintiff.  
Retherford, 844 P.2d at 964-966; see Gilger, 2000 UT 23 at ¶¶ 10, 11 n.1; 
Gottling, 2002 UT 95 ¶ 8, n.1.  As set forth above, the UOSH Act specifically 
addresses discharge in retaliation for exercising a right under the UOSH Act, 
and this injury is an indispensable element of Graham’s claim of wrongful 
discharge in violation of the public policy embodied in the UOSH Act against 
retaliation for exercising a right under the UOSH Act.  Graham’s claim is 
therefore preempted by the UOSH Act.   
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Graham’s claim is similarly preempted under the more generally 
applicable preemption analysis set forth in Gilger and Gottling.  See Gilger, 
2000 UT 23 at ¶¶ 11-13; Gottling, 2002 UT 95 ¶¶ 8-14.  As discussed above, a 
preemptive intent is implied by the structure and purpose of the UOSH Act—
both in the pervasiveness of its provisions relating to retaliation and in the fact 
that recognition of Graham’s cause of action would stand as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of the UOSH 
Act. 
Graham seeks to proceed in tort for the admitted reason that his 
potential recovery in tort is more generous than that under the UOSH Act.  
This is irrelevant, however, to the question of preemption, and Graham should 
not be permitted to circumvent the express remedy for alleged retaliatory 
discharge provided by the UOSH Act.  Accordingly, this Court should affirm 
the district court’s ruling and remand this case for further proceedings below. 
DATED this 1st day of July 2019.  
 
/s/ Mark A. Wagner                      . 
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R614-1-10.  Discrimination. 
 A.  General. 
 1.  The Act provides, among other things, for the adoption of 
occupational safety and health standards, research and development 
activities, inspections and investigations of work places, and 
record keeping requirements.  Enforcement procedures initiated by 
the Commission; review proceedings as required by Title 63G, Chapter 
4, Administrative Procedures Act; and judicial review are provided 
by the Act. 
 2.  This rule deals essentially with the rights of employees 
afforded under section 34A-6-203 of the Act.  Section 34A-6-203 of 
the Act prohibits reprisals, in any form, against employees who 
exercise rights under the Act. 
 3.  The purpose is to make available in one place 
interpretations of the various provisions of Section 34A-6-203 of 
the Act which will guide the Administrator in the performance of 
his duties thereunder unless and until otherwise directed by 
authoritative decisions of the courts, or concluding, upon 
reexamination of an interpretation, that it is incorrect. 
 B.  Persons prohibited from discriminating. 
 Section 34A-6-203 defines employee protections under the Act, 
because the employee has exercised rights under the Act.  Section 
34A-6-103(11) of the Act defines "person".  Consequently, the 
prohibitions of Section 34A-6-203 are not limited to actions taken 
by employers against their own employees.  A person may be chargeable 
with discriminatory action against an employee of another person.  
Section 34A-6-203 would extend to such entities as organizations 
representing employees for collective bargaining purposes, 
employment agencies, or any other person in a position to 
discriminate against an employee. (See, Meek v. United States, F. 
2d 679 (6th Cir., 1943); Bowe v. Judson C. Burnes, 137 F 2d 37 (3rd 
Cir., 1943).) 
 C.  Persons protected by section 34A-6-203. 
 1.  All employees are afforded the full protection of Section 
34A-6-203.  For purposes of the Act, an employee is defined in 
Section 34A-6-103(6).  The Act does not define the term "employ".  
However, the broad remedial nature of this legislation demonstrates 
a clear legislative intent that the existence of an employment 
relationship, for purposes of Section 34A-6-203, is to be based upon 
economic realities rather than upon common law doctrines and 
concepts.  For a similar interpretation of federal law on this 
issue, see, U.S. v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704 (1947); Rutherford Food 
Corporation v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722 (1947). 
 2.  For purposes of Section 34A-6-203, even an applicant for 
employment could be considered an employee. (See, NLRB v. Lamar 
Creamery, 246 F. 2d 8 (5th Cir., 1957).)  Further, because Section 
34A-6-203 speaks in terms of any employee, it is also clear that 
 
 
the employee need not be an employee of the discriminator.  The 
principal consideration would be whether the person alleging 
discrimination was an "employee" at the time of engaging in 
protected activity. 
 3.  In view of the definitions of "employer" and "employee" 
contained in the Act, employees of a State or political subdivision 
thereof would be within the coverage of Section 34A-6-203. 
 D.  Unprotected activities distinguished. 
 1.  Actions taken by an employer, or others, which adversely 
affect an employee may be predicated upon nondiscriminatory grounds.  
The proscriptions of Section 34A-6-203 apply when the adverse action 
occurs because the employee has engaged in protected activities.  
An employee's engagement in activities protected by the Act does 
not automatically render him immune from discharge or discipline 
for legitimate reasons, or from adverse action dictated by non-
prohibited considerations. (See, NLRB v. Dixie Motor Coach Corp., 
128 F. 2d 201 (5th Cir., 1942).) 
 2.  To establish a violation of Section 34A-6-203, the 
employee's engagement in protected activity need not be the sole 
consideration behind discharge or other adverse action.  If 
protected activity was a substantial reason for the action, or if 
the discharge or other adverse action would not have taken place 
"but for" engagement in protected activity, Section 34A-6-203 has 
been violated. (See, Mitchell v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 278 
F. 2d 562 (8th Cir., 1960); Goldberg v. Bama Manufacturing, 302 F. 
2d 152 (5th Cir., 1962).)  Ultimately, the issue as to whether a 
discharge was because of protected activity will have to be 
determined on the basis of the facts in the particular case. 
 E.  Specific protections-complaints under or related to the Act. 
 1.  Discharge of, or discrimination against an employee because 
the employee has filed "any complaint under or related to this Act" 
is prohibited by Section 34A-6-203.  An example of a complaint made 
"under" the Act would be an employee request for inspection pursuant 
to Section 34A-6-301(6).  However, this would not be the only type 
of complaint protected by Section 34A-6-203.  The range of 
complaints "related to" the Act is commensurate with the broad 
remedial purposes of this legislation and the sweeping scope of its 
application, which entails the full extent of the commerce power.  
((See Cong. Rec., vol. 116 P. 42206 December 17, 1970).) 
 2.  Complaints registered with Federal agencies which have the 
authority to regulate or investigate occupational safety and health 
conditions are complaints "related to" this Act.  Likewise, 
complaints made to State or local agencies regarding occupational 
safety and health conditions would be "related to" the Act.  Such 
complaints, however, must relate to conditions at the workplace, as 
distinguished from complaints touching only upon general public 
safety and health. 
 
 
 3.  Further, the salutary principles of the Act would be 
seriously undermined if employees were discouraged from lodging 
complaints about occupational safety and health matters with their 
employers.  Such complaints to employers, if made in good faith, 
therefore would be related to the Act, and an employee would be 
protected against discharge or discrimination caused by a complaint 
to the employer. 
 F.  Proceedings under or related to the act. 
 1.  Discharge of, or discrimination against, any employee 
because the employee has exercised the employee's rights under or 
related to this Act is also prohibited by Section 34A-6-203.  
Examples of proceedings which would arise specifically under the 
Act would be inspections of work-sites under Section 34A-6-301 of 
the Act, employee contest of abatement date under Section 34A-6-303 
of the Act, employee initiation of proceedings for promulgation of 
an occupational safety and health standard under Section 34A-6-202 
of the Act and Title 63G, Chapter 3, employee application for 
modification of revocation of a variance under Section 34A-6-
202(4)(c) of the Act and R614-1-9., employee judicial challenge to 
a standard under Section 34A-6-202(6) of the Act, and employee 
appeal of an order issued by an Administrative Law Judge, 
Commissioner, or Appeals Board under Section 34A-6-304.  In 
determining whether a "proceeding" is "related to" the Act, the 
considerations discussed in R614-1-10.G. would also be applicable. 
 2.  An employee need not himself directly institute the 
proceedings.  It is sufficient if he sets into motion activities of 
others which result in proceedings under or related to the Act. 
 G.  Testimony. 
 Discharge of, or discrimination against, any employee because 
the employee "has testified or is about to testify" in proceedings 
under or related to the Act is also prohibited by Section 34A-6-
203.  This protection would of course not be limited to testimony 
in proceedings instituted or caused to be instituted by the 
employee, but would extend to any statements given in the course of 
judicial, quasi-judicial, and administrative proceedings, including 
inspections, investigations, and administrative rulemaking or 
adjudicative functions.  If the employee is giving or is about to 
give testimony in any proceeding under or related to the Act, he 
would be protected against discrimination resulting from such 
testimony. 
 H.  Exercise of any right afforded by the Act. 
 1.  In addition to protecting employees who file complaints, 
institute proceedings under or related to the Act it also prohibited 
by Section 34A-6-203 discrimination occurring because of the 
exercise "of any right afforded by this Act."  Certain rights are 
explicitly provided in the Act; for example, there is a right to 
participate as a party in enforcement proceedings (34A-6-303).  
 
 
Certain other rights exist by necessary implications.  For example, 
employees may request information from the Utah Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration; such requests would constitute the 
exercise of a right afforded by the Act.  Likewise, employees 
interviewed by agents of the Administrator in the course of 
inspections or investigations could not subsequently be 
discriminated against because of their cooperation. 
 2.  Review of the Act and examination of the legislative history 
discloses that, as a general matter, there is no right afforded by 
the Act which would entitle employees to walk off the job because 
of potential unsafe conditions at the workplace.  Hazardous 
conditions which may be violative of the Act will ordinarily be 
corrected by the employer, once brought to his attention.  If 
corrections are not accomplished, or if there is dispute about the 
existence of a hazard, the employee will normally have opportunity 
to request inspection of the workplace pursuant to Section 34A-6-
301 of the Act, or to seek the assistance of other public agencies 
which have responsibility in the field of safety and health.  Under 
such circumstances, therefore, an employer would not ordinarily be 
in violation of Section 34A-6-203 by taking action to discipline an 
employee for refusing to perform normal job activities because of 
alleged safety or health hazards. 
 a.  Occasions might arise when an employee is confronted with 
a choice between not performing assigned tasks or subjecting himself 
to serious injury or death arising from a hazardous condition at 
the workplace.  If the employee, with no reasonable alternative, 
refuses in good faith to expose himself to the dangerous condition, 
he would be protected against subsequent discrimination.  The 
condition causing the employee's apprehension of death or injury 
must be of such a nature that a reasonable person, under the 
circumstances then confronting the employee, would conclude that 
there is a real danger of death or serious injury and that there is 
insufficient time, due to the urgency of the situation, to eliminate 
the danger through resort to regular statutory enforcement channels.  
In addition, in such circumstances, the employee, where possible, 
must also have sought from his employer, and been unable to obtain, 
a correction of the dangerous condition. 
 I.  Procedures - Filing of complaint for discrimination. 
 1.  Who may file.  A complaint of Section 34A-6-203 
discrimination may be filed by the employee himself, or by a 
representative authorized to do so on his behalf. 
 2.  Nature of filing.  No particular form of complaint is 
required. 
 3.  Place of filing.  Complaint should be filed with the 
Administrator, Division of Occupational Safety and Health, Labor 




 4.  Time for filing. 
 a.  Section 34A-6-203(2)(b) provides protection for an employee 
who believes that he has been discriminated against. 
 b.  A major purpose of the 30-day period in this provision is 
to allow the Administrator to decline to entertain complaints which 
have become stale.  Accordingly, complaints not filed within 30 days 
of an alleged violation will ordinarily be presumed to be untimely. 
 c.  However, there may be circumstances which would justify 
tolling of the 30-day period on recognized equitable principles or 
because of strongly extenuating circumstances, e.g., where the 
employer has concealed, or misled the employee regarding the grounds 
for discharge or other adverse action; where the employee has, 
within the 30-day period, resorted in good faith to grievance-
arbitration proceedings under a collective bargaining agreement or 
filed a complaint regarding the same general subject with another 
agency; where the discrimination is in the nature of a continuing 
violation.  In the absence of circumstances justifying a tolling of 
the 30-day period, untimely complaints will not be processed. 
 J.  Notification of administrator's determination. 
 The Administrator is to notify a complainant within 90 days of 
the complaint of his determination whether prohibited discrimination 
has occurred.  This 90-day provision is considered directory in 
nature.  While every effort will be made to notify complainants of 
the Administrator's determination within 90 days, there may be 
instances when it is not possible to meet the directory period set 
forth in this section. 
 K.  Withdrawal of complaint. 
 Enforcement of the provisions of Section 34A-6-203 is not only 
a matter of protecting rights of individual employees, but also of 
public interest.  Attempts by an employee to withdraw a previously 
filed complaint will not necessarily result in termination of the 
Administrator's investigation.  The Administrator's jurisdiction 
cannot be foreclosed as a matter of law by unilateral action of the 
employee.  However, a voluntary and uncoerced request from a 
complainant to withdraw his complaint will be given careful 
consideration and substantial weight as a matter of policy and sound 
enforcement procedure. 
 L.  Arbitration or other agency proceedings. 
 1.  An employee who files a complaint under Section 34A-6-
203(2) of the Act may also pursue remedies under grievance 
arbitration proceedings in collective bargaining agreements.  In 
addition, the complainant may concurrently resort to other agencies 
for relief, such as the National Labor Relations Board.  The 
Administrator's jurisdiction to entertain Section 34A-6-203 
complaints, to investigate, and to determine whether discrimination 
has occurred, is independent of the jurisdiction of other agencies 
or bodies.  The Administrator may file action in district court 
 
 
regardless of the pendency of other proceedings. 
 2.  However, the Administrator also recognizes the policy 
favoring voluntary resolution of disputes under procedures in 
collective bargaining agreements. (See, e.g., Boy's Market, Inc. v. 
Retail Clerks, 398 U.S. 235 (1970); Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 
379 U.S. 650 (1965); Carey v. Westinghouse Electric Co., 375 U.S. 
261 (1964); Collier Insulated Wire, 192 NLRB No. 150 (1971).)  By 
the same token, due deference should be paid to the jurisdiction of 
other forums established to resolve disputes which may also be 
related to Section 34A-6-203 complaints. 
 3.  Where a complainant is in fact pursuing remedies other than 
those provided by Section 34A-6-203, postponement of the 
Administrator's determination and deferral to the results of such 
proceedings may be in order. (See, Burlington Truck Lines, Inc., v. 
U.S., 371 U.S. 156 (1962).) 
 4.  Postponement of determination.  Postponement of 
determination would be justified where the rights asserted in other 
proceedings are substantially the same as rights under Section 34A-
6-203 and those proceedings are not likely to violate the rights 
guaranteed by Section 34A-6-203.  The factual issues in such 
proceedings must be substantially the same as those raised by 
Section 34A-6-203 complaint, and the forum hearing the matter must 
have the power to determine the ultimate issue of discrimination. 
(See, Rios v. Reynolds Metals Co., F. 2d (5th Cir., 1972), 41 
U.S.L.W. 1049 (October 10, 1972):  Newman v. Avco Corp., 451 F. 2d 
743 (6th Cir., 1971).) 
 5.  Deferral to outcome of other proceedings.  A determination 
to defer to the outcome of other proceedings initiated by a 
complainant must necessarily be made on a case-to-case basis, after 
careful scrutiny of all available information.  Before deferring to 
the results of other proceedings, it must be clear that those 
proceedings dealt adequately with all factual issues, that the 
proceedings were fair, regular, and free of procedural infirmities, 
and that the outcome of the proceedings was not repugnant to the 
purpose and policy of the Act.  In this regard, if such other actions 
initiated by a complainant are dismissed without adjudicative 
hearing thereof, such dismissal will not ordinarily be regarded as 
determinative of the Section 34A-6-203 complaint. 
 M.  Employee refusal to comply with safety rules. 
 Employees who refuse to comply with occupational safety and 
health standards or valid safety rules implemented by the employer 
in furtherance of the Act are not exercising any rights afforded by 
the Act.  Disciplinary measures taken by employers solely in 
response to employee refusal to comply with appropriate safety rules 
and regulations, will not ordinarily be regarded as discriminatory 
action prohibited by Section 34A-6-203.  This situation should be 
distinguished from refusals to work, as discussed in R614-1-10.H.  
 
 
Item 4:  Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, 
Granting Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment, and Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Perform 
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